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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN) early acquisition shortcomings identified by 
the Government Accountability Office, DHS Inspector General and 
Congressional Research Service reports.  Challenges identified in the initial 
development of HSIN reveal a lack of adequate program management, 
requirements planning, risk analysis and architectural design led to low user 
acceptance and continued DHS information-sharing challenges.  Lessons 
learned from HSIN are examined to determine which best practices can help 
ensure major government software-acquisition projects meet user’s needs.  
Often overlooked, but critical, software program-management practices include 
user requirements planning that focuses development on the highest priority 
tasks and encourages the timely accomplishment of project milestones, risk 
planning that ensures potential roadblocks are understood and addressed, and 
architectural design practices that foster the integration of both newly developed 
and legacy information systems.  Without initial and continuous life-cycle 
requirements, risk and architectural planning, software projects run an increased 
risk of going over budget, missing operational milestones and ultimately not 
meeting its user’s needs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One clear lesson of September 11 was the need to improve the 
sharing of information. To prevent further attacks and to protect the 
homeland, we need to stay a step ahead of those individuals and 
organizations intent upon harming America. Key to preventing 
future attacks is the gathering of information about terrorist risks 
and threats and then ensuring that the information gets into the 
hands of those whose responsibility it is to protect our communities 
and critical infrastructure.1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
 One mandate of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 directed the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to coordinate data and information 
sharing among federal agencies, local and state governments, and the private 
sector in order to counter terrorist threats and strengthen homeland security.2  
Driving this requirement was the fact that a large amount of government 
intelligence data is never processed, and a vast amount of potentially critical 
information “has undergone little or no assessment regarding its accuracy or 
implications.”3  Improving communications and information sharing between 
federal, state, and local agencies is a critical requirement established by the 
Homeland Security Act, and its implementation is part of the DHS’s primary 
mission.   
 To meet these requirements, DHS deployed the Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN), with development beginning in 2002 and fielded in 
July 2004.  This web-based portal application provides users with access to raw 
 
1 U.S. Executive Office of the President, “National Strategy for Information Sharing: 
Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing,” October 2007, 
7, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA473664. 
2 Homeland Security Information Sharing Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296, November 25, 
2002), 11. 
3 Harold Relyea and Jeffrey W. Seifert. Congressional Research Service, Information 
Sharing for Homeland Security a Brief Overview. Congressional Information Service, Library of 
Congress, 2005, 2. 
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collected data, subject analysis, document libraries, “chat” tools, and emergency 
management collaboration modules.  However, due to shortcomings in the 
current system, the DHS has proposed a follow-on system dubbed “HSIN Next 
Generation,” and has subsequently stopped development of the first-generation 
system.4 
At the request of Congress in 2007, members of the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) presented the results of a comprehensive study to 
the House and Senate Homeland Security Committees. The information 
indicated that the original HSIN was poorly coordinated in its development, did 
not interface well with existing state and local data and applications, and 
contained unnecessary redundancy with programs used by regional centers.5  
The GAO study also claims that many of the flaws present in the development of 
HSIN, which hampered its widespread use, were also present in the 
development of the next-generation system currently under development.   
 This thesis examines the development and implementation of government 
information-sharing systems and looks specifically at the flawed acquisition and 
management processes that hamper information sharing, as well as best 
practices that facilitate collection, processing, and availability of government 
information.  Proper acquisition and management of government systems 
requires careful assessment of existing technology, used by current and 
perspective users, along with a review of successful government and industry 
acquisition strategies. 
 This thesis specifically identifies shortcomings evident in the development 
and management of HSIN to order to answer the following questions:   
1. What flaws existed in the development and deployment of the Homeland 
Security Information Network?  
 
4 The term system in this thesis refers to software and its related architecture and 
components and not to the hardware or network used to run the software. 
5 Relyea and Seifert. Information Sharing for Homeland Security, 3. 
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2. How can lessons learned from early management, planning and 
implementation of HSIN apply to the development of current and future 
systems? 
3. What planning and management practices reduce cost and development 
time when considering user’s needs and project risks during a program’s 
life cycle? 
4. What specific system design standards (component-based architectures, 
legacy system integration, service-oriented architecture, and other 
technologies) facilitate a cost-effective layered approach to developing 
flexible systems with a high likelihood of compatibility with future 
technology? 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
In the past several years, numerous systems have been developed and 
implemented across the government in an effort to better share information.  The 
question to ask now is whether interagency information sharing has adequately 
improved since 9/11.  The answer seems to be weighted toward the negative.  
Amy Zegart writes in her book, Spying Blind,  “Information sharing and analysis, 
two critical shortcomings raised in the wake of 9/11, have not improved much 
and in some cases have gotten worse.”6  She goes on to explain “…information 
is stored on nearly thirty separate, incompatible information networks.  To access 
them all, analysts must use more than a half-dozen different computers stacked 
underneath their desks.”7   Zegart is not alone in her analysis.  The Markle 
Foundation Task Force, one of the leading private advocates for intelligence 
 
6 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 911 (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 186. 
7 Ibid., 187. 
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information sharing, states that “today we are still vulnerable to attack because—
as on 9/11—we are still not able to connect the dots.”8 
The development of government systems requires careful assessment of 
existing technology for current and future users, and the implementation of 
component reuse and interoperability standards that facilitate simplified 
development and maintenance of the three application tiers (data, business logic, 
and user interface), as well as the ability to share data and functionality with 
external applications.   
 This thesis argues that newly developed government data-sharing 
systems require dedicated program management to ensure adequate initial and 
continuous life-cycle planning are an integral part of the system’s design.  When 
time is critical, planning for user requirements, risk and architecture are 
sometimes neglected.  This thesis shows that many of HSIN’s flaws are rooted in 
poor management practices that overlooked these critical aspects of systems 
design. 
The following is a list of recommendations for the development and 
acquisition of new systems based on lessons learned from HSIN and other 
government systems, reports and studies conducted to address software 
acquisition shortcomings, as well as commercial and academic sources listed in 
the next chapter.  At a minimum, any large user-based, government software 
acquisition strategy should have the following elements: 
1. Assignment of a fulltime project manager and staff to oversee the 
acquisition and development process. 
2. Use of best practices in requirements planning that ensures user and 
stakeholder needs are prioritized, modeled, validated and adequately 
resourced.9   
 
8 Markle Foundation Task Force, “Nation at risk policy makers need better information to 
protect the country,” 2009, 1, 
http://www.markle.org/events/20090310_nar/20090304_mtf_report.pdf. 
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3. Use of best practices in risk planning that covers the project’s entire life 
cycle from initial planning to retirement in order to anticipate and mitigate 
potential problems. 
4. Develop an architecture plan that considers interoperability, component 
reuse, extensibility and service-oriented design practices that help new 
systems integrate legacy data and increase the probability of compatibility 
with future technology.   
C. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis utilizes a qualitative research approach to determine ways the 
government software acquisition process can be improved.  This method 
provides a systematic approach to understand and evaluate complex and 
continually evolving information systems subject matter.  The intent of this 
research is to determine where weaknesses exist in the government system 
acquisition process and, through a comprehensive review of current practices, 
offer methods to improve the process.   
D. OVERVIEW 
 Following a literature review, the third chapter of this thesis consists of a 
case study that examines the planning, management and acquisition of HSIN 
and the mistakes made in the process.  GAO, CRS and IG reports along with 
private foundation studies are considered to determine which best acquisition 
practices could have improved the development of HSIN.       
 Chapter IV begins the process of examining best practices that may have 
alleviated many of the program management challenges identified earlier in this 
thesis.  The first of these is system acquisition requirements planning that help 
developers understand and document the core problem set that allows program 
managers to define minimum essential tasks and steer resources to where they 
 
9 The term stakeholder is used in this thesis to describe the organization accepting the 
delivered product, whether developed internally or contracted to a vendor. 
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are needed most.  Practices like user elicitation, analysis and modeling, and 
continuous project requirements validation help keep the project’s main tasks 
front and center.  The chapter concludes with a case study of Intellipedia based 
on a paper by the CIA’s Chief Technology Officer for the Center for Mission 
Innovation, Calvin Andrus.  The development of Intellipedia shows how 
intelligence information sharing needs can be met by understanding the user 
needs and selecting the best software and system to match clearly defined 
requirements. 
 Chapter V addresses the final two challenges faced by HSIN, identified by 
GAO and IG and described in Chapter II; that is, risk planning and architectural 
design practices.  Risk planning involves identifying potential problems that could 
occur during system development, determining the probability of a risk occurring 
and devoting time to create a plan to mitigate and respond to identified risks.  
Without risk planning, project managers and developers are forced to 
continuously fight fires instead of simply implementing alternative plans when 
contingencies occur.  Finally, Chapter V closes with a discussion of modern 
componentized architectural design practices that ensure software is reusable, 
extensible, interoperable with external systems and able to communicate with 





                                           
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 Several U.S. government agencies, non-profit organizations, academic 
institutions, and standards organizations publish reports concerning the 
development of government information systems and software acquisition 
strategies.  There are also several web-portals devoted to software acquisition 
best practices, past experience, and resources for integrating rapidly changing 
technology into developing and legacy systems.  The best method available to 
build a comprehensive review of best practices is to extract information from 
these sources. 
A. GOVERNMENT SOURCES 
The most comprehensive work in assessing government acquisition of 
information-sharing systems comes from GAO and Inspector General (IG) 
reports.  The bibliography section of this thesis provides several sources of GAO 
and IG reports detailing the shortcomings of HSIN’s initial planning and 
development.  These reports demonstrate that the main priority in creating a new 
system should be to build a prioritized functionality set based on, for example, an 
assessment of systems already in use (if any).  Once developers and 
stakeholders agree to and document requirements, the choice to create new 
functionality or integrate existing technology can be evaluated.  This process 
reduces the likelihood that duplicate systems are developed and that the end 
user’s needs are ultimately satisfied. 
The GAO has also provided some useful guidance concerning data 
collection and management, including XML metadata tagging technology that 
fosters information sharing between agencies.10  In a report focusing on the 
 
10 XML is a plain-text data structure. Metadata is a method to include contextual information 
with raw data in the form of XML tags.  Combined sources of metadata can be searched to 
provide data links and potentially produce information.  Metadata can be transmitted and received 
between non-compatible systems because the tags are formed using XML that is readable across 
nearly all platforms. 
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integration of data technologies, the GAO recommends the development of 
information-sharing standards through web services and secure XML 
communication-based protocols that enable information sharing between existing 
systems.  As an example, the report uses transportation department data 
combined with elevation, weather models, census, and infrastructure data from 
four agencies to analyze various response strategies to natural and manmade 
disasters.  In order to do this, data must be tagged and made available through 
modern data agnostic techniques.11  
 The leading resource providers for best or “gold” software system 
management is Defense Department’s Information Analysis Center12 and 
Carnegie Melon’s Software Engineering Institute (SEI), as well as several 
Department of Defense (DoD) armed services specific sites.13  These 
organizations are dedicated to providing government and industry a single 
source repository of accepted and best practices for software system 
architecture, acquisition and management.  Other sources of government system 
data integration include the Lessons Learned Information Sharing portal 
(LLIS.gov), the National Strategy on Information Sharing, and several 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports (these and others are listed in 
the bibliography section). 
B. NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS 
 Respected non-profit groups such as the RAND Corporation and the 
Markle Foundation have provided valuable information-sharing and collaboration 
recommendations—some of which have been adopted by the federal 
government.  Similar to the GAO and IG documents, these foundations have  
 
 
11 Randall A. Yim, United States General Accounting Office, “National Preparedness 
Integrating New and Existing Technology and Information Sharing Into an Effective Homeland 
Security Strategy,” 2002, 8, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS34938. 
12 The Data and Analysis Center for Software (n.d.), https://www.thedacs.com/. 
13 Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon (n.d.), http://www.sei.cmu.edu/. 
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produced reports critical of current government information-sharing systems but 
have also provided useful roadmaps for improving systems and managing future 
acquisitions.   
 One particularly useful set of reports comes from the Markle Foundation 
Task Force on National Security in the Information Age.  To date, this privately 
funded task force has produced five reports emphasizing the need for better 
government information-sharing standards.  In the foundation’s 2006 report, 
“Mobilizing Information to Prevent Terrorism,” a comprehensive technology 
review is included, laying a foundation for data interoperability: “One of the 
principal goals of networked information is to separate content from 
applications—i.e., to make information usable and interoperable across many 
applications and systems.”14   
 The Markle Foundation also recommends against centralizing information, 
but rather the implementation of distributed component architecture that covers 
“different domains, each having different security and access requirements.”15  
RAND and the Markle Foundation also cover constitutional law and public and 
private individual rights issues that should be considered when governments 
integrate data.   
 Another prominent organization is the Software Program Manager’s 
Network (SPMN), dedicated to fixing what is broken with the government 
software acquisition process “when essential software disciplines and practices 
are not implemented on large-scale projects, complexity snowballs into chaos 
and cripples or kills programs.”16  One contribution to software acquisition 
strategies is the group’s “16 Critical Software Practices,” which specifically 
addresses underlying cost and schedule drivers that have caused many software 
 
14 John and Mary R. Markle Foundation, “Mobilizing Information to Prevent Terrorism: 
Accelerating Development of a Trusted Information Sharing Environment.” The Markle 
Foundation, 2006, 58. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Software Program Manager’s Network, “The Little Book of Bad Excuses,” 1998, 
http://www.spmn.com/products_guidebooks.html. 
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intensive systems to be delivered “over budget, behind schedule and with 
significant performance shortfalls”—information extremely useful for this thesis.17  
C. ACADEMIC AND STANDARDS BASED INSTITUTIONS 
The purpose of government watchdog and accountability focused 
agencies like the GAO and IG is to review existing government programs and 
provide recommendations for improvement.  Another approach is to study 
organizations that provide guidance for both existing and future system 
development, and recommend development strategies for user interface, 
business logic and data layers across the entire enterprise.     
1.  Enterprise and Service-Oriented Architectures 
For information-sharing systems, one of the best resources is Carnegie 
Melon’s Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Portal dedicated to both 
government and industrial software development and acquisition.18  For 
example, the ISE’s Enterprise Architecture Framework (EAF) and the Mission-
Oriented Success Analysis and Improvement Criteria (MOSAIC) documents 
provide an excellent foundation for managing and planning system architecture 
that incorporates the latest requirements, risk and component-based design 
principles.  One of many beneficial aspects of ISE’s reports concerns leveraging 
existing capabilities across agencies that help find ways to collaborate using a 
broad systems approach to integrating legacy data.  To do this, ISE recommends 
a service-oriented architecture (SOA) that allows agencies to expose their data 
and processes for use by other trusted systems.  This method uses an agnostic 
data layer that eliminates compatibility issues across systems.19   
 
17 Software Program Manager’s Network, “The Little Book of Bad Excuses,” 1998, 1.  
18 Enterprise Architecture Framework Version 2.0, Information Sharing Environment, 2008, 
1, http://www.ise.gov/docs/eaf/ISE-EAF_v2.0_20081021.pdf. 
19 Ibid., 4. 
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2.  User Interface Guidelines 
 While there are seemingly countless academic articles and commercial 
studies related to system architecture and data, government and non-profit 
institutions listed so far generally lack recommendations for user interface 
design.  Academia and commercially published books are a good source to 
bridge this gap.20 Collaborative information systems used in industry and 
government include portals, wikis, content management systems (CMS), and 
mashups (to name a few).  When employed effectively, well-designed user 
interface systems facilitate information sharing and collaboration, increase 
productivity, and aid the government in its need to facilitate end user 
communication.  A poorly designed user interface can impede the flow of 
information and lower productivity.  Making information searchable and 
combining data into useful information require solid technological backend design 
as well as an interface that makes utilizing the delivered information simple for 
the end user.  
3. Complying with Standards  
The software acquisition and project management process has been 
exhaustively studied and documented by industry, standards organizations and 
government for decades. The baseline standard for acquisition is the 
responsibility of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), and 
their work is regarded by both government and industry as the definitive source 
for standardizing many software and system design practices.  For example, the 
IEEE document Standard 1062 provides a complete list of steps necessary to 
manage new software projects.21  
 
20 Several computer science and systems journals, including IEEE Computing Society, the 
SOA Magazine  and the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology  provide 
articles dedicated to user interface integration.  Government sources primarily focus on data and 
business logic layers of software engineering. 
21 IEEE Computer Society. “Software Engineering Standards Committee. and Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers,” IEEE Recommended Practice for Software Acquisition. 
(1994). 
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The IEEE also provides a single source of both academic and commercial 
thought on issues related to user interface.  Several IEEE documents 
standardize the concept of application development using a reusable and layered 
approach to system design and interoperability.  IEEE also recommends a model 
“designed in three layers: presentation, application (also called the business-logic 
layer), and data.”22   These three layers are combined using a component model 
of reusable parts that can be “plugged in” to other systems as required.  For 
example, a security component can be built into the business logic layer that can 
be used across multiple applications.  Improvements and bug fixes to the security 
components can then be applied across the enterprise without redesigning each 
individual system codebase.   
At the user interface layer, component design gives users a common set 
of controls that require less training.  Controls are easily integrated into the 
business logic and data layers of multiple systems via a common Application 
Programmer Interface (API) architecture. These “components are essentially 
characterized by an API…effectively standardizing UI integration.”23   
When combined, the standards organizations and best practice sources 
mentioned in this chapter form a solid foundation for sound system design, 
integration and acquisition strategies.  Practices mentioned by these sources are 
used in Chapters IV and V to offer strategies that could have improved HSIN’s 
initial acquisition, development and integration with legacy systems, and are 









22 Marino Linaje, Juan Carlos Preciado, and Fernando Sanchez-Figueroa, “Engineering the 
Web Track – Engineering Rich Internet Application User Interfaces over Legacy Web Models,” 
IEEE internet computing 11, no. 6 (2007): 53–59. 
23 Ibid. 
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III. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK  
We learned of the pervasive problems of managing and sharing 
information across a large and unwieldy government that had been 
built in a different era to confront different dangers. 
— 9/11 Commission Report 
 A harsh spotlight fell on the intelligence and law enforcement communities 
following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.  Each 
link in the chain that could have exposed or thwarted the attacker’s plan has 
since been thoroughly dissected, analyzed and critiqued by intelligence experts 
around the world.  A lack of adequate information sharing and collaboration 
between the various branches of the U.S. government is often cited as one of the 
major failures contributing to the success of the terrorist’s operation that day.   
To remedy these shortfalls, the U.S. government has taken broad steps to 
reform the intelligence community in order to improve information sharing. Since 
9/11, an expansive intelligence legal framework has been implemented, including 
the passage of the Patriot Act in 2001, establishment of the Department of 
Homeland Security, creation of the Director of National Intelligence position and 
the creation of the National Counter Terrorism Center—all with the intent to 
improve intelligence gathering, sharing, analysis, and dissemination. 
The requirement for networked systems to meet the information-sharing 
and collaboration needs of these newly created government structures spawned 
countless software and system acquisitions that attempt to combine legacy data 
into actionable information accessible by multiple agencies.24  The Department 
of Homeland Security responded to the need to coordinate homeland security 
information by commissioning the web-based application, dubbed the Homeland 
 
24 The term “legacy” is used to describe technology (system, software, data) designed for a 
specific purpose and for a specific agency.  Legacy systems are often proprietary, incompatible 
with external systems and are not designed to be extended by third-party developers.     
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Security Information Network, which was intended to act as a virtual gathering 
point for all levels of government.  This chapter examines the information-sharing 
requirements HSIN was intended to fill, and the challenges facing development 
and adoption of a complex, government information sharing and collaboration 
system.   
HSIN is a well-documented example of a major government information-
system acquisition requiring the development of new software, integration of 
commercial and open-source software, and the need to connect to legacy system 
functionality and data across several agencies.  Looking at how DHS managed 
this requirement provides lessons for future information-system management 
challenges. 
A. HSIN DEVELOPMENT 
DHS’s original goal for HSIN was to provide a means to integrate 
information and communication services between federal, state, local, regional 
and tribal government entities in accordance with the Homeland Security Act of 
200225.  Once complete, HSIN was to be “DHS’s primary nationwide information-
sharing and collaboration tool,” incorporating data from all systems within DHS’s 
jurisdiction.26  The need to quickly establish a conduit between government 
agencies, to prevent another terrorist attack, pushed information system 
development to the top of many government agency’s priority list. For DHS, an 
effective communication platform became one of the department’s highest 
priorities27. 
 
25 Homeland Security Information Sharing Act of 2002. Public Law 107–296, November 25, 
2002, 11. 
26 Government Accountability Office, “Information Technology Numerous Federal Networks 
Used to Support Homeland Security Need to be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local 
Information-Sharing Initiatives: Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House 
of Representatives,” 2007, 2, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS82926. 
27 Ibid., 3. 
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By 2003, DHS planned HSIN to have thousands of initial users across 
sixteen government agencies. Early on, the decision was made to segregate 
users into communities based on their particular information and collaboration 
needs.  Communities within HSIN were to be connected with an underlying 
emphasis on the entities they support within eight mission areas (see Table 1) 
that now total thirty-five communities of interest (COI).  Each community, such as 
defense or law enforcement, has separate portals within HSIN. 
Supporting Entities Mission Focus 
Federal Critical Sectors 
State and Local Defense 
Territorial Emergency Management 
Tribal Homeland Security 
 Intelligence 
 Law Enforcement 
 Multi-Mission 
 International 
Table 1.   HSIN Entities and Community Focus Areas28 
In early development stages, DHS identified eleven major legacy networks 
under its control that would have to be integrated into the HSIN framework.  
Existing systems like the Customs and Border Protection Network (CBP), 
Immigration, Customs Enforcement Network (ICENet), and Transportation and 
Security Administration Network (TSANet) are independently developed systems 
                                            
28 About Homeland Security Information Network. Department of Homeland Security (n.d.), 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1156888108137.shtm. 
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comprised of proprietary software, data and communication protocols that 
presented a substantial development challenge in connecting these disparate 
systems.  These challenges were compounded by a continuously accelerated 
HSIN delivery schedule and a lack of dedicated program management.29 
B. INITIAL SYSTEM APPLICATIONS 
 The initial rollout of HSIN in 2004 consisted of four major component 
designed to connect government agencies and provide a conduit for sensitive but 
unclassified information.  Web-based information sharing adopted by DHS was 
built around what then was called HSIN Enterprise Architecture 1.0, and 
consisted of multiple portal web pages, a discussion forum, real-time chat tools 
and a searchable document repository.   
The purpose of the HSIN portal web application is to provide a framework 
for the delivery of user-specific content based on group membership.30  Also 
referred to as a Content Management System (CMS) or dashboard, HSIN 
content page sections are delivered to users from multiple data sources 
populated with information based on COI membership, user configuration and 
assigned role.  For example, an emergency management user’s page contains 
generic homeland security-related sections, as well as pages, links and sections 
managed by the Emergency Management community.  Portal pages also link to 
other HSIN resources that are tailored to a user’s membership profile.   
DHS discussion forums provide non-real-time, moderated, text-based 
discussions that also serve as an information repository for use by each 
community or interest.  Forum posts are archived and searchable for use by 
 
29 Government Accountability Office,  “Information Technology Homeland Security 
Information Network Needs to be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local Initiatives: 
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives,” 2007, 10, 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS83332. 
30 Web applications differ from a collection of static web pages in that delivered content can 
vary based on the a set of parameters and logic coded by the web developer.  A Portal web 
application is a method to logically organize content sections on a webpage that is configurable 
by the user.  Content sections typically contain links, news, email, and other data driven content. 
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current and future users as required.  For example, a user may post a question, 
and then have multiple community members provide answers that are later 
accessible by COI users who have the same question.  
The HSIN document library is a managed repository of regulations, 
directives and planning products, as well as user-submitted documents.  The 
result is a searchable, continually growing archive of information segmented by 
community with many documents available via search requests available to all 
HSIN users.   
While the other services mentioned provide a method to build 
collaborative knowledge over time, the HSIN’s real-time chat component allows 
multiple users to discuss events as they happen.  Text-based meetings between 
two or more geographically separated users can be conducted and archived for 
later use by meeting attendees.   
Other system components included reporting and graphic applications that 
supply suspicious incident and pre-incident information, mapping and imagery, 
24x7 situational awareness, and analysis of terrorist threats, tactics, and 
weapons.31 
C.  ROLLOUT AND RECEPTION 
 In February 2004, DHS officially launched HSIN portal with and its initial 
set of community-centric components. By July 2004, all fifty states and regional 
centers were connected and issued user accounts.32  However, as the system 
was deployed at regional centers, it soon became clear that technical issues, 
limited or non-existent integration with legacy systems and duplication of existing 
functionality, would severely limit HSIN’s acceptance.   
 
31 Government Accountability Office, “Homeland Security Opportunities Exist to Enhance 
Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies: Report to 
Congressional Requesters,” 2006, 30, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS76414. 
32 Relyea and Seifert. Information Sharing for Homeland Security, 5. 
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 By the end of 2004, a flurry of GAO, Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), and private organization reports critical of HSIN and other information-
sharing initiatives began to surface.  A 2004 Congressional Report to Congress 
(CRS) summed up the problem as  
… concerns about coordination and duplication of (government 
information sharing) initiatives have been raised since there 
currently appears to be no centralized inventory of all the 
information sharing initiatives being carried out within and between 
the federal, state, and local levels.33   
In its rush to produce HSIN, it appears that DHS did not attempt to determine if 
similar systems were in use and did not develop an adequate set of user 
requirements.   
The 2004 CRS report identifies four regional and national systems that 
provided similar functionality to HSIN and serve many of the same users.  The 
rollout of HSIN resulted in confusion as to which system was primary for a given 
circumstance.  For example, one issue concerned how law enforcement and 
emergency management systems would integrate with HSIN.    The primarily law 
enforcement system called Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), 
provides identical functionality as HSIN.  According to the GAO, HSIN program 
managers were unaware of the existence RISS during critical stages of HSIN’s 
development: 
According to RISS program officials, they met with DHS twice (on 
September 25, 2003 and January 7, 2004) to demonstrate that their 
RISS ATIX application could be used by DHS for sharing homeland 
security information.  However, communication from DHS on this 
topic stopped after these meetings, without explanation.  According 
to DHS officials, they did not remember the meetings, which they 
attribute to the departure from DHS staff who had attended.34 
 
33 Relyea and Seifert. Information Sharing for Homeland Security, 5. 
34 Government Accountability Office. “Information Technology Numerous Federal Networks 
Used to Support Homeland Security Need to be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local 
Information-Sharing Initiatives: Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House 
of Representatives,” 2007, 10. 
 19
                                           
D. REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING AND HSIN  
The Regional Information Sharing System is a Department of Justice 
(DOJ) information system designed to connect local, regional and federal law 
enforcement agencies and foster collaboration with other government agencies.  
Originally established in 1974, RISS is designed to first connect local agencies 
with regional centers and then to the national RISS network.  “The RISS program 
uses a regional approach, so that each center can tailor/focus its resources on 
the specific needs of its area, while still coordinating and sharing information as 
one body for national-scope issues.”35   
RISS includes traditional web-based information-sharing applications like 
web portals for each region, forums, real-time chat and a document library, as 
well as applications focusing on law enforcement issues.  Application databases 
include RISSGang, for collecting and sharing information related to gang activity, 
and RISSIntel, for the collection and search of crime-based intelligence.   
RISS anti-terrorism initiatives include the Anti-Terrorism Information 
Exchange (ATIX) system.  This component of RISS was developed in 2002 to 
“facilitate communication and information sharing among personnel responsible 
for planning and implementing actions to prevent, mitigate, and recover from 
terrorist incidents and disasters.”  In fact, ATIX was a key player for law 
enforcement and disaster recovery efforts following Hurricane Isabel in 
September 2003.  ATIX was also the primary communication and planning 
mechanism for the 2004 G8 Summit in Georgia and the Republican and 
Democratic conventions.36 
 In DHS’s rush to create an information sharing network for its perspective 
users, a survey of existing systems was never adequately conducted.  The GAO 
reported in 2007 that HSIN was developed and deployed without an 
“understanding of the relevance of the Regional Information Sharing Systems 
 
35 Relyea and Seifert. Information Sharing for Homeland Security, 9. 
36 Ibid., 10. 
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program to homeland security information sharing.”37  The result was a duplicate 
system targeting the same users with nearly identical features.   
Today, DOJ agencies continue to use RISS primarily for information 
sharing and HSIN for monitoring real-time incidence like natural disasters.  
During national events like a presidential inauguration, control centers must 
monitor multiple systems and, today, still have no easy way to manage these 
multiple duplicative systems.   
The challenge for HSIN is to integrate RISS components and data into 
DHS-based systems to, at a minimum, allow users to search RISS-based crime 
data.  So far, HSIN program managers have been unable to incorporate RISS 
data due to architectural limitations inherent in HSIN underlying structure—
highlighting both the need for a flexible, interoperable architecture (described in 
Chapter V) as well as effective program management practices.38 
E. HSIN NEXT GENERATION DEVELOPMENT 
 By the beginning of 2008, DHS had poured over $90 million into HSIN and 
over $611 million combined into the eleven homeland security networks under its 
control.39  Despite seemingly adequate funding and over four years of 
development, HSIN still had few users;  DHS stopped actively marketing the 
system since it was clear that HSIN was not meeting DHS’ own expectations. 
Early in 2008, DHS decided to scrap further development of HSIN and 
begin planning a revamped version of HSIN.  The new system, called HSIN Next 
 
37 Government Accountability Office. “Information Technology: Homeland Security 
Information Network Needs to be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local Initiatives: 
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives,” 2. 
38 Government Accountability Office. “Homeland Security Efforts Under Way to Develop 
Enterprise Architecture, But Much Work Remains: Report to the Subcommittee on Technology, 
Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, Committee on Government 
Reform, House of Representatives,” 2004, 1. 
39 Government Accountability Office. “Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks 
Used to Support Homeland Security Need to be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local 
Information-Sharing Initiatives: Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House 
of Representatives,” 1. 
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Generation or “Next Gen,” was to be an architectural redesign that would more 
easily incorporate data and functionality from external sources and third-party 
applications.  Acknowledging past management failures, project improvements 
for Next Generation include the establishment of a program management office 
to oversee system and acquisition planning.  DHS established a full-time project 
manager (PM) and staff for the first time since HSIN development began. 
Included with the full-time PM team is a staff position responsible for gathering 
requirements from all users and for surveying existing systems for HSIN 
integration of legacy data and functionality.   
The DHS also established a Homeland Security Information Network 
Advisory Council (HSINAC) with the mission to improve the effectiveness of 
HSIN information-sharing initiatives, and a mandate to oversee the development 
and improvement of the next generation system.  HSINAC held the first annual 
three-day meeting in late October 2007.  This meeting established policy, 
business process and governance requirements needed to better manage 
HSIN.40   
Since its first meeting, HSINAC has helped create a comprehensive HSIN 
governance structure to ensure system requirements “are directly tied to mission 
areas and communication capabilities.”41  Figure 1 provides clues to how the 
advisory council has improved HSIN program management and its attempt to 
match program capabilities with system requirements.  As the Change and 
Improvement Flow chart shows (Figure 1), DHS Operations organization flows 
results of user outreach initiatives into business requirements that are then 
considered by a Change Control Board (CCB) chaired by the HSIN program  
 
40 Meeting Minutes: Homeland Security Information Network Advisory Committee Inaugural 
Meeting, October 30 – November 1, 2007, The Department of Homeland Security, December 28, 
2007. 
41 Ibid., 2. 
manager.  Approved system changes, improvements, and/or additions are then 
packaged for implementation during upgrades.  Under this new paradigm, user 
requirements are the primary driving force for change. 
 
Figure 1. HSIN Change and Improvement Flow42  
F. HSIN NEXT GENERATION APPLICATIONS 
Improved management and user outreach, along with the funding of an 
enhanced architectural design, has allowed HSIN Next Generation to improve 
integration of contract-developed applications, commercial components, and 
open source software.  The Appendix provides a description of how these new 
components were used during the recent Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf 
of Mexico.   
1.  HSIN Common Operating Picture    
The HSIN portal includes a Common Operating Picture (COP) component 
similar to systems used by the Department of Defense.  HSIN COP provides 
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42 Final Report: Homeland Security Information Network Advisory Committee Meeting, 
February 10–12, 2009, The Department of Homeland Security, March 27, 2009, 11, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsinac_mtg_2009-2-1012.pdf. 
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users with real-time, constantly updated information concerning new and ongoing 
DHS operations.  The COP also tracks media reports and internal and external 
requests for information.  Task responsibility is assigned for each information 
request along with up-to-the-minute status information accessible to all portal 
users.  Each task has a tracking date, source, and resolution information once 
complete.      
2. HSIN Connect 
Representing a huge advance in real-time collaboration for HSIN, Connect 
is a virtual meeting tool available to all system users for anytime, on-demand, 
online video meetings via point-to-point encrypted data for enhanced security.  
Users can view documents on the presenter’s screen during the session and 
record the session for later viewing.  Connect is made by Adobe Systems, and is 
one of the first third-party tools incorporated into HSIN. 
3.  Wikis and Online Reading Rooms (Open Source Component 
Integration) 
HSIN Next Generation’s improved architecture design now includes a 
provision to integrate open source components.  An example is the 
establishment of general information wikis as well as online reading rooms 
created to ensure all users have the latest information concerning HSIN-tracked 
events.43  Users with edit privileges can add, delete, or correct information on the 
fly.  One particularly useful section is a lessons learned wiki.  From these pages, 
user can create additional wiki pages where users can post questions, make 
comments or request additional information.   
 
43 A wiki is an open source web-based collaboration tool that allows users to create content 
for others to add, delete, or modify as required.  For additional information, visit 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki. 
 24
                                           
4. Federated Search and Role-Based Data Access 
 One of the original purposes of HSIN was to facilitate information sharing 
between government agencies.  As discussed in this section, a lack of 
management, planning, user outreach and surveys of existing systems during 
HSIN’s initial planning resulted in an inflexible architecture that limited the 
integration of external data and functionality.  The difficulty stems from database 
compatibility and connection issues between incompatible data sources and 
communication protocols.  To solve compatibility issues, a recent search 
paradigm, Federated Search, allows separate systems to feed external data 
requests without the need for a huge centralized database.  Federated search, 
along with strict role-based data access, will eventually allow an HSIN user to 
search disparate data sources with results tailored to user type or community.  
“This means that a Sherriff Doctor with a Secret clearance can see all the law 
enforcement, medical, and secret information.”44  Federated search is enhanced 
by component and Service Oriented Architectural design practices discussed in 
Chapter V of this thesis. 
G. LESSONS FROM HSIN 
The planning problems DHS encountered developing and deploying HSIN 
are common in large-scale software acquisition, with “many projects, perhaps 20 
percent, will be abandoned, often after multimillion-dollar investments—and the 
biggest projects will fail most often.”45  Pressure to rapidly develop and deliver a 
fully functioning, multiple-user system across several government agencies will 
almost certainly be encountered again in the future.  These projects may be 
large, national-level system like HSIN, or smaller initiatives like Intellipedia 
(detailed in Chapter IV).  Regardless of size, these new systems will almost 
 
44 Final Report: Homeland Security Information Network Advisory Committee Meeting, 
February 10–12, 2009, 18. 
45 Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon: Software Development, 2010, 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/solutions/softwaredev/. 
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certainly require a combination of internally developed technology, off-the-shelf 
software and custom-built components, along with the use of open source 
software to satisfy a set of requirements.  To improve these future projects, it is 
beneficial to look at large-scale system acquisitions like HSIN to help mitigate the 
risk of repeating past mistakes.   
One of the main shortcomings noted in nearly every report concerning the 
development of HSIN was a lack of program management early in the project.  It 
is evident in these reports that operational necessity trumped the need for solid 
management practices.  It can be argued that DHS’s initial and almost fatal 
mistakes were in not creating a full-time project manager with an adequately 
staffed office during the initial planning and design phases of the project.  This 
lack of management led to the following missteps during early HSIN development 
and deployment: 
1. Inadequate Requirement Planning and Management   
Understanding the problem a new system is trying to solve and how best 
to meet user’s needs is fundamental to system design planning.  Inadequate 
requirement planning caused HSIN to have an increased risk of exceeding 
“project costs, delayed schedules and performance shortfalls.”46  As the GAO 
noted, initial HSIN planners did not adequately survey potential users or attempt 
to determine what government systems are currently in use by HSIN’s intended 
user base.  The next chapter of this thesis focuses on best practices in system 
requirement planning that could have helped HSIN during early planning and are 
likely beneficial for future government system acquisitions. 
 
46 Government Accountability Office, “Information Technology Management Improvements 
Needed on the Department of Homeland Security's Next Generation Information Sharing System: 
Report to Congressional Requesters,” 2008, 14, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS104962. 
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2.  Inadequate Risk Planning and Management 
Risk management during a project’s life cycle helps ensure potential 
problems are managed and (when possible) mitigated.  To some planners, 
project risk management is a luxury that time often does not permit. However, in 
many cases, good risk management practices help identify design flaws that 
could potentially result in schedule and cost overruns.  For HSIN, risk planning 
did not begin until the development of the next generation system; “however, 
they (HSIN risk managers) have yet to identify all key risks surrounding the 
project and develop risk mitigation plans.”47   
Chapter V of this thesis identifies SEI, DACS and other leading 
government acquisition resource best practices for software risk management.  
These software risk-planning resources show that devoting time to risk 
management helps planners anticipate and effectively react to problems that can 
lead to cost and schedule overruns. 
3. Inadequate Architectural Design Practices 
Selecting an architectural design is fundamental to the success of 
complex systems like HSIN.  Poor system design and planning can lead to a 
chaotic mix of functionality that is difficult to maintain and secure.  Modern design 
practices incorporate component architectures that break complex projects into 
manageable pieces.  Chapter V of this thesis examines best practices in system 
architecture that fosters the integration of legacy systems that easily supports 
future technology. 
H. CONCLUSION 
Since HSIN was first delivered in 2004, the system has struggled to meet 
its user’s need for a single source of homeland security information and 
 
47 Government Accountability Office, “Information Technology Management Improvements 
Needed on the Department of Homeland Security's Next Generation Information Sharing System: 
Report to Congressional Requesters,” 2008. 
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collaboration.  Fortunately, recent improvements in architecture, integration of 
commercial components and a dedicated program management team have 
helped HSIN Next Generations gain acceptance within the DHS community.   
To help HSIN and other government system acquisition programs, the 
GAO, CMS and non-governmental organizations have identified the source of 
HSIN’s initial development shortcomings.  These include not assigning a full-time 
project management team, which ultimately led to inadequate requirements 
planning, risk management and architectural design practices.  The remainder of 
this thesis is devoted to identifying key best practice in each of these areas of 
software system development, as well as acquisition resources useful for further 
study. 
 28




                                           
IV.  IMPORTANCE OF ACQUISITION PLANNING AND 
REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT 
Question: What does the timing look like (to provide better data 
interoperability for HSIN)? 
Answer: This could take five years…HSIN itself was put out under 
threat conditions, there wasn’t time to lay out the plan–due to 
operational necessity. 
—HSINAC meeting minutes, February 12, 200948 
 Effective acquisition of government information-sharing systems is critical 
to the success of agencies that are mandated is to piece together disparate data 
streams and combine them into actionable information.  Developing an 
acquisition strategy based on lessons learned from past development, 
commercial industry standards and academia, along with advances in 
component architectures that foster interoperability and extensibility, can help 
increase the probability of success for future acquisition projects.49 
Government and industry software and systems development is a vast 
subject area to consider.  A project manager—with a mandate to oversee 
systems that combine multiple external data sources, have thousands of role-
based users, contain sensitive information, and integrate internally developed, 
commercial, purchased and open-source software—has literally thousands of 
high-level details to consider.  The scope and scale of such an undertaking is the 
subject of countless volumes of research.  Despite this complexity, it is worth 
attempting to identify key issues that hamper the success of government system 
projects and locate solutions that reduce complex problems into manageable 
subsets.   
 
48 Final Report: Homeland Security Information Network Advisory Committee Meeting, 
February 10–12, 2009, 18. 
49 Extensibility is a software design feature that allows functionality to be added in the future.  
This helps insure software systems do not become obsolete as new technology is developed.  
Interoperability allows software to exchange information with internal or external systems. 
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 This chapter begins with a look at why large acquisition projects fail and 
how lessons learned from failed projects can be used to build better project 
management practices.  This chapter also considers system project planning and 
how carefully developed requirements are critical to the success of an effective 
software acquisition strategy.  These requirement processes continue throughout 
a program’s life cycle and feed into the risk and architectural strategies covered 
in Chapter V. 
A. WHY ACQUISITIONS SOMETIMES FAIL 
Statistics from Carnegie Melon’s Software Engineering Institute portal show 
that HSIN is not unique in its struggle to evolve from initial development to a 
delivered, user-accepted product: 
Organizations and governments worldwide will spend about $1 
trillion this year on IT projects. Recent data suggested only about 
35 percent of those projects are likely to be completed on time and 
on budget, with all their originally specified features and functions. 
Many projects, perhaps 20 percent, will be abandoned, often after 
multimillion-dollar investments—and the biggest projects will fail 
most often.50 
 Attempting to understand why software acquisition projects fail is a well-
established area of research.  Over the past twenty years, lead sources for 
government program improvement include the Defense Science Board (DSB), 
Software Engineering Institute (SEI) and the National Defense Industrial 
Association (NDIA), as well as the GAO.  In fact, the GAO’s 2004 Defense 
Acquisitions reports are considered a “rallying point for any and all acquisition 
organizations who are struggling to improve the results from their software 
acquisition processes.”51  Also, a recent Carnegie Melon academic study, 
“Lessons Learned from a Large, Multi-Segment, Software-Intensive System,” is 
 
50 Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon: Software Development. 
51 The Data and Analysis Center for Software: Software Acquisition Gold Practice, 2010, 
https://goldpractice.thedacs.com/practices/api/. 
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devoted to the shortcomings commonly found in government acquisition projects 
and is the culmination of many years of research.52  
 According to these sources, many of the reasons for information 
technology (IT) project failures are also areas identified as shortcomings 
associated with HSIN’s early development.  According to these sources, some of 
the most common reasons information technology (IT) acquisitions fail are a lack 
of initial requirements, risk and architectural planning.  In fact, according to the 
GAO and DHS’s own HSINAC, a lack of initial planning and research are the 
main reason HSIN failed to attract users.53  These primary sources of acquisition 
research indicate that it is critical for managers to understand the importance of 
these areas of software acquisition planning.   
 Over the years, since DHS first deployed HSIN, it became clear that 
HSIN’s “initial development was not based upon a solid set of user requirements; 
as a result, the performance of HSIN program management was not 
adequate.”54  The rush to develop and deploy a system—any system—lacked 
the management oversight needed to create a coherent plan.  DHS subsequently 
found that pushing an inadequately planned and managed system onto their user 
base created a difficult set of challenges.  DHS is now painfully aware that fixing 
an existing flawed system is much more difficult than doing the necessary upfront 
planning.  DHS also found that marketing an ineffective system hampers its 
adoption and use, even as system improvements are later delivered.55  
 Fortunately, DHS’s establishment of an HSIN program office, with a full-
time program manager and staff in 2007, helped the development of the next 
 
52 Lessons Learned from a Large, Multi-Segment, Software-Intensive System, Software 
Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon, n.d., 1, 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/09tn013.cfm. 
53 Final Report: Homeland Security Information Network Advisory Committee Meeting, 
February 10–12, 2009, 18. 
54 Ibid., 3. 
55 HSINAC Committee’s annual meeting minutes from March 2007 and March 2009 detail 
the difficulty in marketing system improvements. 
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generation system currently being deployed.  However, shortcomings associated 
with HSIN’s early development serve as an anchor that demonstrates the need 
for management practices that include requirement, risk and architectural 
planning.  If DHS had initially established a full-time program manager, with 
adequate time to lay a solid foundation in these three areas, HSIN usability and 
acceptance would certainly look different today.     
B. PROJECT REQUIREMENTS PLANNING 
 Managing the development of a large, complex system requires a plan.  
The fundamental focus of a project plan is to clearly lay out the problem the 
system is trying to solve.  Understanding and documenting the core problem set 
allows the program manager to define and communicate the minimum essential 
high-level tasks that must be accomplished during system development.56  
Clearly establishing these minimum requirements helps focus development 
team-member activities and helps to defend against the pitfalls associated with 
inadequate planning.     
 A comprehensive case study of fifteen successful software-system 
development projects, published in IEEE Software Journal in conjunction with the 
Department of Defense Information Analysis Center, identified several key 
requirement practices used in successful project acquisitions.57  Software 
acquisition best practices identified by this study separate requirements planning 
into subtasks that include user elicitation, requirement analysis, modeling and 
validation.  These subtasks occur throughout development, and continue as the 
system is deployed and upgraded.  Once initial requirements are established, 
timelines, benchmarks and milestones form the pillars of a management plan that 
guides the entire process. 
 




                                           
1. User Requirements Elicitation 
 Understanding user needs is a critical component of requirements 
planning that continues throughout the development process. “The most 
successful teams always involve customers and users in the requirements 
elicitation (RE) process…according to one study, user participation is one of the 
most important factors contributing to requirements engineering success.”58  
 For HSIN, meeting user requirements is one of the most frequently cited 
areas needing improvement.59  Clues to fixing this requirements task can be 
found in SEI’s Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI), considered the 
software systems acquisition bible by many in government and industry.  CMMI 
Software Goal 1 (SG-1) states that user needs, expectations, and interfaces 
must be translated into a concise document that evolves during a product 
development. SG-1 recommends that the project management team observe 
user workflow patterns, and conduct interviews and operational scenarios to 
determine the technical functionality required by users.  The user “typically 
describes requirements as capabilities expressed in broad operational terms 
concerned with achieving a desired effect under specified standards and 
regulations.”60  The effect described should also have enough detail to guide 
user interface designs.  For example, instead of simply indicating the user would 
like database search functionality, the requirement should also describe filtering, 
content needs and a description of how the user interface should display the 
output.  The solicitation process should continue through all phases of 
development and deployment to ensure current and future needs are included in 
the process. 
 
58 Hubert F. Hofmann, “Requirements Engineering as a Success Factor in Software 
Projects,” IEEE Software, July 1, 2001, 65. 
59 Government Accountability Office, “Information Technology Management Improvements 
Needed on the Department of Homeland Security's Next Generation Information Sharing System 
Report to Congressional Requesters,” 3. 
60 CMMI for acquisition, Version 1.2: CMMI-ACQ, v1.2. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Carnegie Mellon 
University, Software Engineering Institute, 2007), 97. 
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 Once a comprehensive list of requirements is developed, CMMI 
recommends prioritizing the list to ensure user priorities also meet the needs of 
the organization.  Prioritized requirements are then analyzed and modeled in 
order to build milestones and performance goals. 
User and Stakeholder 
inputs (examples) Intermediate Process 
User Requirement 
Outputs 
User Questionnaires Compile list based on user inputs 
Discussion Groups Resolve conflicting requirements 
Operational scenarios 
from end users Prioritize requirements list
Internal business process 





Requirements (to feed 
program definition, 
analysis and validation 
processes) 
Table 2.   Sample Requirements Inputs, Processes and Outputs61 
2. Analysis and Modeling 
 Both the CMMI and IEEE acquisition documents recommend building 
models that analyze user and stakeholder requirements in terms of minimum 
operational needs of the proposed system.  The analysis phase is simply a 
further refinement of user-solicited requirements that are later matched to 
functionality.  For example, some user-gathered inputs are valid, but do not fit 
overall functional requirements needed for initial operations.  Below the line 
requirements contain “nice to have” functionality to include if resources permit, 
but are not necessary for the system to be considered functional.  Other aspects 
of analysis concern stakeholder needs that addresses proposed functionality in  
 
                                            
61 CMMI for acquisition, Version 1.2: CMMI-ACQ, v1.2. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Carnegie Mellon 
University, Software Engineering Institute, 2007), 96. 
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terms of “cost, schedule, performance, functionality, reusable components, 
maintainability, and risk.”62  Chapter V of this thesis covers the latter three 
architectural-related tasks. 
 Modeling is a relatively new concept that involves creating interface 
prototypes that allow developers to simulate proposed minimum functionality 
based on the user requirement document developed during requirements 
analysis.  These models can serve to synchronize developer, stakeholder and 
user understanding of how the interface should deliver functionality that matches 
identified requirements.  Models can use custom-built simulations or can be 
demonstrated using existing applications whose functionality will be combined to 
form the user interface. 
3. Validation and Verification 
 Validation and verification is essentially a big-picture sanity check 
conducted after the initial requirements document is complete.  The stakeholders 
and developers work together to ensure requirements are properly prioritized, 
that requirements included in the initial design meet minimum essential system 
needs, and that lower priority items can be integrated in later versions if 
necessary.  Again, these decisions feed the risk and architectural design 
requirements conducted later in the development cycle.63 
C. REQUIREMENTS PROGRESS MANAGEMENT 
 Once initial operating requirements are established through elicitation, 
analysis and modeling, the IEEE recommends selecting processes that will serve 
as progress indicators.64  These indicators establish core task milestones that 
are integrated into progress and management review timelines that facilitate 
 
62 CMMI for acquisition, Version 1.2: CMMI-ACQ, v1.2., 104. 
63 IEEE Computer Society. Software Engineering Standards Committee. and Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, IEEE Recommended Practice for Software Acquisition, 59. 
64 Hubert F. Hofmann, “Requirements Engineering as a Success Factor in Software 
Projects,” 62. 
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resource and allocation planning.  Without a program-managed set of core tasks, 
development often strays as complexity increases and user requirements evolve 
during development.  Constant unchecked changes without milestones can lead 
to time and cost overruns.65  Changes during the development life cycle are 
necessary and even desired; however, without a mechanism to manage 
alterations to initially agreed-to functionality, projects can grow out of control.  
DACS gold practices for project management states it this way: 
Requirements Management (RM) seeks to reduce the risk of cost 
and schedule overruns by establishing a way to control the 
continuing definition of requirements as changes occur and 
unforeseen needs arise and as knowledge is gained during 
development, in contrast to more traditional development 
approaches where requirements were documented (often without 
involvement of the developer) prior to any development activities 
and frozen for the life of the effort.  The successful implementation 
of RM depends on having flexible scenarios that require the 
establishment of a process to manage requirements (in lieu of rigid 
pre-defined specifications) that addresses specification, change 
control and traceability, and identifies what stakeholders must be 
involved in the various activities of the process throughout the life 
cycle.66 
 This evolutionary approach allows the PM team to manage requirement 
changes without the project losing focus on the core problem set discussed 
earlier.   
D. SURVEY OF EXISTING TECHNOLOGY 
 Designing and managing large-scale systems that incorporate data from 
multiple legacy systems, replace and/or add functionality and include commercial 
and open-source components requires intensive upfront and ongoing planning to 
establish a flexible and interoperable architecture.  However, before selecting an 
architecture, it is important to understand what part of the system must be 
developed in-house, and can be commercially purchased or acquired as an 
 
65 The Data and Analysis Center for Software, “Requirements Engineering.” 
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open-source solution that is later modified to meet previously defined 
requirements.  The CIA’s information-sharing program, Intellipedia, described 
next, provides a good example of a government organization matching user 
requirements with existing functionality. 
E. CASE STUDY: INTELLIPEDIA AS AN OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS 
FOR GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SHARING 
 In 2006, CIA officer Calvin Andrus wrote an essay concerning government 
information sharing and the Internet titled, "The Wiki and the Blog: Toward a 
Complex Adaptive Intelligence Community."67  In his essay, Andrus defined the 
problem he sought to solve by first arguing that information management 
techniques must evolve in order to be useful to the end user.  Intelligence 
managed by a small subset of information managers attempting to maintain 
content from thousands of sources is inherently inefficient.  Seemingly 
insignificant pieces of data that could be tied together to form useful intelligence 
often slips through the cracks when large amounts of data pass through few 
hands.   
 To solve this problem, Andrus suggested that individual intelligence 
officers be empowered to shape source data in real time and “be allowed to 
react—in independent, self-organized ways—to developments in the national 
security environment.”68 According to Andrus, intelligence data must also be 
easily shared with all users and include a mechanism for feedback from anyone 
in the community.   
 Andrus’ call, for more dynamic, independent and self-organized 
information sharing that is less centrally managed and more user accessible, is a 
good starting point for a software acquisition manager to transition from a defined 
 
66 The Data and Analysis Center for Software, “Requirements Engineering.” 
67 D. Calvin Andrus, The Wiki and the Blog: Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence 
Community, Studies in Intelligence, 2005. http://ssrn.com/abstract=755904. 
68 Ibid., 3. 
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problem to a user requirement.  In this case, a requirements list could be 
developed that included interface requirements describing how data should be 
input, edited and commented on by users.   
Fortunately, for this particular problem set, a model already existed, one 
that met the user’s need for a user-edited content-management system.  The 
open-source web-based content system, called a Wiki, allows individuals to “self-
organize around shared knowledge.”69   Once set up, the Wiki interface allows 
information contributors to add information, edit other user’s information and 
provide amplifying comments anywhere within the document.  Any user can 
create a new document that the community can edit as the situation evolves.   
In this case, the model (Wiki software) fits the requirements so closely that 
the model itself becomes the solution.  The intelligence-inspired Wiki became 
known as Intellipedia and is in widespread use in the intelligence community 
today.  The selection of an open-source, easily managed system almost certainly 
reduced the cost of acquiring a system to meet the user requirements 
established by Andres’ essay.   
F.  CONCLUSION 
 Understanding why major acquisition projects fail can help future project 
managers create strategies to avoid common pitfalls that have plagued past 
acquisition projects.  Organizations like the GAO and Carnegie Melon’s SEI have 
identified requirements, risk and architectural design as planning areas 
commonly neglected in struggling and failed government software acquisitions.  
These planning areas are also cited by GAO and CRS reports as weaknesses 
associated with HSIN’s initial development. 
 A basic task for any new software system is to determine the problem it is 
trying to solve.  Best practices in project planning help program managers 
develop, prioritize, analyze and model requirements in order to ensure proposed 
 
69 D. Calvin Andrus, The Wiki and the Blog: Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence 
Community, Studies in Intelligence, 2005, 3. http://ssrn.com/abstract=755904. 
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functionality meets the user’s needs.  Good requirements planning also helps 
establish minimum initial functionality and milestones that keep the project from 
exceeding budget and time limitations.  A solid understanding of the user’s needs 
and matching functionality can then be analyzed for developmental risks and 
broken into manageable components that lay a foundation for selecting an 
appropriate architecture. 
 40
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V. RISK MANAGEMENT AND ARCHITECTURAL STANDARDS 
FOR COMPONENT INTEGRATION 
I have not failed. I've just found 10,000 ways that won't work. 
   —Thomas Edison 
 Managing a large project certainly involves some degree of risk.  Whether 
risk ultimately results in failure often depends on preparation and planning for the 
unexpected.  Chapter IV discussed requirements as the first of the three 
commonly neglected areas of software system acquisition (requirements, risk, 
architecture planning).  As described in Chapter IV, best practices in 
requirements management include elicitation, analysis, modeling and validation 
to help match user needs with application functionality.  During this process, 
requirements can be matched to a model to help the developer and stakeholder 
fully define the problem as well as find potential solutions through contract-
developed applications, commercial off-the-shelf software (COTS) and/or open-
source projects.  From here, complex functionality can be separated components 
that, when combined, comprise an initial system design. 
 How these components interact, and how data is shared and distributed, 
is part of the system architectural design process that involves decisions that 
have ramifications throughout the projects life cycle.  Implementing the wrong 
architectural solution can mean legacy and newly created systems do not easily 
interact or share data and functionality.  Architecture, together with requirement 
planning, ultimately allows project managers to begin to build a comprehensive 
project plan.  However, plans developed during this stage almost always 
encounter obstacles during execution.  Devoting time to plan for potential 
obstacles is key to mitigating the risk of a project going off track.   
 This chapter examines two often-overlooked areas of system design that 
should be considered from the beginning of the system acquisition process: risk 
management and architectural design.  Planning for risk is sometimes seen as a 
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nice to have but not crucial aspect of system planning.  However, good risk 
management can help identify design weakness that later result in delays and 
cost overruns.  System architecture is another planning task sometimes given 
minimal time and resources.  However, systems that are haphazardly pieced 
together components can lead to unintended consequence that include 
dependence on proprietary data and code, security flaws and interoperability 
issues—all avoidable with good architectural planning. 
A. SOFTWARE RISK MANAGEMENT 
1. Defining Software Development Risk 
 With an adequately researched and prioritized set of user requirements 
and procedures in place to manage these requirements, the project manager 
should next consider risks that can cause project delays.  The Data and Analysis 
Center for Software defines risk as: 
A proactive approach for minimizing the uncertainty and potential 
loss associated with a project.  A risk is an event or condition that, if 
it occurs, has a positive or negative effect on a project’s objectives.  
Future events can be categorized as opportunity-focused (positive 
risk) if their consequences are favorable, or as threat-focused 
(negative risk) if their consequences are unfavorable.70 
 At a basic level, software risk management is a process for developing a 
list of hazards or problems that could reasonably occur through a system’s life 
cycle, determine the probability of each occurring, and develop plans to mitigate 
or otherwise react to negative events.  Failing to develop and manage a risk plan 
can be likened to failing to purchase auto insurance.  If the insurance purchased 
is never needed, it is tempting to consider the expense a waste of money.  
However, if an accident does occur, insurance can prevent financial ruin, and is 
therefore seen as a positive.  
 
70 The Data and Analysis Center for Software, Risk Management, 2010.  
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 Setting aside development time specifically for risk management, 
particularly for projects with limited development time, can seem unnecessary.  
However, over the past fifteen to twenty years, software complexity has grown 
exponentially.  Without an adequate risk plan and management process, 
program managers can find themselves fighting fires instead of effectively 
managing the unexpected.   
There are two ways of dealing with risk. One, risk management, is 
proactive and carefully analyzes future project events and past 
projects to identify potential risks. Once risks are identified, they are 
dealt with by taking measures to reduce their probability or to 
reduce their impact. The alternative to risk management is crisis 
management. It is a reactive and resource-intensive process, with 
available options constrained or restricted by events.71 
 When risk is not carefully considered and the unexpected delay does 
occur, risk planning is correctly highlighted as lacking.  For HSIN, risk 
management has been cited as one of three major factors contributing to the 
systems shortcomings.  In 2008, the GAO reported that HSIN’s aggressive 
upgrade schedule had precluded adequate risk management planning.  In fact, it 
was not until five years into the development of HSIN that the implementation of 
a risk management plan was established.  As noted in a 2008 GAO report, “DHS 
has begun to develop a risk management plan that defines staff roles and 
responsibilities.  However, it has yet to identify all key risks surrounding the 
project and develop risk mitigation plans and completion milestones.”72 As 
illustrated next, adding risk planning is a straightforward process that continues 
through the project’s life cycle.  
 
71 Software Technology Support Center, “Understanding Risk Management,” CrossTalk, 
2005, http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2005/02/0502stsc.html. 
72 Government Accountability Office, “Information Technology Management Improvements 
Needed on the Department of Homeland Security's Next Generation Information Sharing System:  
Report to Congressional Requesters,” 2008, 4. 
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2. Risk Methodologies 
 Systematic methods to manage risk in software development date back to 
the late 1980s with the IEEE’s tutorial “Software Risk Management,” in which 
core risk concepts were established.73  In this paper, Dr. Barry Boehm defines 
the purpose and importance of risk management planning as methods to:74  
1. Avoid software project disasters, including runaway budgets and 
schedules, defect-ridden software products, and operational failures. 
 2. Avoid rework caused by erroneous, missing, or ambiguous 
 requirements, design or code, which typically consumes 40–50% of the 
 total cost of software development. 
 3. Avoid overkill with detection and prevention techniques in areas of 
 minimal or no risk. 
 4. Stimulate a win-win software solution where the customer receives 
 the product they need and the vendor makes the profits they expect. 
 Boehm makes the point that risk management, regardless of project type, 
is a continuous cycle of risk analysis, prioritization and planning that highlights 
potential problems and provides contingency plans for in case those problems 
arise.  Without a risk plan, problems are simply address as they occur, which 
almost certainly increase costs and results in project delays as solutions are 
sought on the fly.   
 While specific risk management processes vary for each project, Figure 2 
provides a good illustration of a generic project risk flow.  Planning begins by 
identifying and analyzing problems that have the potential to compromise a 
project’s success.  Identifying risks requires time to be set aside specifically for 
 
73 Barry W. Boehm and  Ez. Nahouraii, IEEE Computer Society, Software Risk Management: 
Principles and Practices (IEEE Computer Society Press, 1989). 
74 Ibid., 89. 
stakeholders, requirements managers, developers and project manager to 
brainstorm the challenges that could present themselves during the projects 
development.   
 
Figure 2. Risk Management Process75 
 Once risks are identified, project planers should then devote time to 
examining the likelihood each identified risk has of occurring.  In order to rack-
and-stack identified risk, Boehm offers a simple risk equation that allows 
planners to quantify risk: 
 RE = Probability (UO) * Loss (UO), Where UO = Unexpected Outcome 
 Calculating probability and loss are subjective and often rely on 
experience gained from past project acquisition and development.  Boehm’s 
method forces planners to consider how likely an event will occur (Risk #1) and if 
identified risks could increase in probability of another identified risk occurring 
(Risk #2).  This process helps prioritize the list of risks so that resources can be 
appropriately allocated and continuously tracked and reassessed. 
                                            




                                           
 Since the original work was published, the SEI and IEEE have expanded 
upon Boehm’s work by developing software risk-management frameworks that 
simplify incorporating risk planning into any project.76  Also, risk checklists from 
NASA and SEI, as well as non-software-specific risk checklists from Arizona 
State University and the Department of Energy, are considered industry 
standards.77 
3. Advances in Risk: From Tactical Risk to MOSAIC 
  As government software projects increase in complexity, the need for 
initial and ongoing detailed planning becomes increasingly critical.  While the 
IEEE and SEI have advanced the field of risk planning for government systems, 
the potential for failure increases as systems become more complex.  To meet 
these challenges, SEI has expanded its basic software risk framework, which 
“codified” risk management best practices, and laid a foundation for further 
advances.78  The first such advance is their Mission-Oriented Success Analysis 
and Improvement Criteria (MOSAIC) process, intended to help project managers 
maintain control of large, distributed system development that is increasingly 
common in government settings.79 
 The main advance MOSAIC provides is a shift from tactical risk planning 
to a higher-level framework, better suited to a distributed development 
environment.  SEI describes the traditional tactical risk approach as planners 
looking for what can go wrong, determining which of these risks are most 
 
76 Christopher J. Alberts and Audrey J. Dorofee, Risk Management Framework (Software 
Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon, 2010), http://www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/10tr017.pdf. 
77 Arizona State University, Question List for Software Risk Identification in the Classroom, 
n.d., http://www.eas.asu.edu/~riskmgmt/qlist.html. 
78 Christopher J. Alberts and Audrey J. Dorofee, Risk Management Framework (Software 
Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon, 2010), http://www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/10tr017.pdf. 
79 Distributed systems are application and hardware infrastructures that connect multiple 
networked computers that form clusters that connect to other clusters.  Each cluster can have a 
separate user-base and purpose.  Applications must communicate within clusters and with other 
clusters.  Managing distributed system can create complex communications, reliability, 
availability, serviceability and scalability issues that require innovative risk management 
techniques. 
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important and allocating resources on the most likely risks identified.80  This 
approach has worked well for systems that operate with few interconnections, 
like desktop applications for example, but are not as well suited for complex 
interconnected system development.    
 Networked distributed systems like HSIN operate in a dynamic 
environment with multiple layers of separately developed legacy systems that 
have a high degree of uncertainty when considering potential risks.  A bottom-up 
tactical risk analysis typically focuses on corrective action associated with each 
identified risk occurrence, but does not adequately address the impact of a risk’s 
consequences on the network of systems.  This is because distributed system 
development contains such a large number of risk variables that predicting the 
outcome of a particular event becomes increasingly difficult. 
 The intent of SEI’s MOSAIC is to solve the shortcomings of the traditional 
tactical risk planning by analyzing a project in terms of its processes.  Processes 
have drivers that “guide the outcome (of a process) toward key objective 
(success state) or away from them (failure state).”81  SEI identifies twenty drivers 
associated with software system development; they range from defining program 
objectives, and planning to final certification and acceptance.   
 
80 Audrey Dorofee and Christopher Alberts, Rethinking Risk Management: NDIA Systems 
Engineering Conference. Software Engineering Institute. 2009. 
81 Ibid., 32. 
 Figure 3. Risk Management MOSAIC for Multi-Enterprise Environments82 
 Drivers are divided into categories that cover the spectrum of the software 
development life cycle that can be analyzed across an organization.  As shown in 
Figure 3, organizational analysis is combined for use in system-wide analysis 
and planning across segmented proprietary organizations using legacy systems.  
This approach helps planners visualize risk interaction across system segments 
to determine how individual risks affect the broader enterprise.  This approach is 
easier to accomplish when the system is comprised of components organized by 
a component-based architecture, as discussed next. 
B. SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE 
 Another aspect of software system development sometimes overlooked in 
time-critical projects is architectural design.  Software architecture is defined by 
IEEE Standard 610.12-1990 as "the structure of the components of a program 
and/or system, their interrelationships, and principles and guidelines governing 
                                            
82 Dorofee and Alberts, Rethinking Risk Management: NDIA Systems Engineering 
Conference. Software Engineering Institute, 2009, 129. 
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their design and evolution over time."83  Another useful definition concerns the 
structural relationship between components and their effect on managing risk: 
Software architecture of a computing system is the structure or 
structures of the system, which comprise software components, the 
externally visible properties of those components, and the 
relationships among them.  By ‘externally visible’ properties, we are 
referring to those assumptions other components can make of a 
component, such as its provided services, performance 
characteristics, fault handling, shared resource usage, and so on. 
The intent of this definition is that a software architecture must 
abstract away some information from the system (otherwise there is 
no point looking at the architecture, we are simply viewing the 
entire system) and yet provide enough information to be a basis for 
analysis, decision making, and hence risk reduction.84 
 This component approach to system design is integral in 
developing systems that incorporate data and functionality from external 
legacy systems.  As stated in the quote above, software architectural 
considerations are not typically concerned with low-level component 
construction like algorithms or language selection.  Instead, architectural 
design can be thought of as an assembly of puzzle pieces (functional 
components) with a set of rules that define how the pieces fit together and 
how separate puzzles are connected to create a larger construct.   
 Without adequate architectural planning that includes risk and 
requirements, software architecture can become a haphazard mesh of 
functionality that is poorly organized and prone to security and 
maintenance issues.  Early HSIN development has been noted for lacking 
adequate architectural planning, which has resulted in HSIN’s difficulty in 
connecting several important external data sources (RISSNet for 
example):   
 
83 IEEE Computer Society. Standards Coordinating Committee. et al., IEEE Standard 
Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology (New York, NY: Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers, 1990). 
84 Len Bass, Paul Clements, and Rick. Kazman, Software Architecture in Practice, SEI series 
in software engineering (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1998), 21. 
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[DHS] is missing, either in part or in total, all of the key elements 
expected to be found in a well-defined architecture, such as 
descriptions of business processes, information flows among these 
processes, and security rules associated with these information 
flows, to name just a few... Moreover, the key elements that are at 
least partially present in the initial version were not derived in a 
manner consistent with best practices for architecture 
development... As a result, DHS does not yet have the necessary 
architectural blueprint to effectively guide and constrain its ongoing 
business transformation efforts and the hundreds of millions of 
dollars that it is investing in supporting information technology 
assets.85 
 Solid architectural design planning helps developers manage complex 
systems by segmenting or partitioning functionality into manageable 
components.  Best practices in software architectural design described in this 
section produces systems that are extensible and interoperable, built using data 
agnostic communication to maximize information sharing, and are easier to 
maintain and secure.    
1. Evolving Need to Manage Complexity 
 Early government and industrial computer systems were primarily 
designed to facilitate existing business processes.  Applications were developed 
to facilitate data input and retrieval for use within a single organization.  These 
early systems had little or no ability to communicate with external organizations 
or between agencies.86  By the late 1980s, increased power and availability of 
desktop computers and networked communications introduced the ability to 
share information and functionality to improve information sharing, reduce 
development cost and increase productivity.  However, the complexity of 
 
85 Government Accountability Office. and Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee 
on Technology, “Homeland Security Efforts Under Way to Develop Enterprise Architecture, But 
Much Work Remains: Report to the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, 
Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, Committee on Government Reform, House of 
Representatives,” 2. 
86 National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on the Fundamentals of Computer Science: 
Challenges and Opportunities, “Computer Science Reflections on the Field, Reflections from the 
Field,” 2004, 1, http://www.netlibrary.com/urlapi.asp?action=summary&v=1&bookid=123466. 
integrating legacy system functionality and data has proved tremendously 
challenging for both government and industry.  Modern software architectural 
designs manage the complexity of large distributed systems by partitioning and 
layering functionality. 
 A core aspect of modern software architecture is the concept of 
component-based partitioning that reduces system complexity.  To illustrate 
componentized complexity, system designers often explained the concept using 
a dice metaphor.  Consider a single-sided die with each of the six sides 
representing a possible condition or state.  Of course, a single six-sided die can 
have one of six states when thrown, one through six.  Three six-sided die can 
have 216 possible states, which is 36 times more complex than a single die 
(216/6).87 
 
Figure 4. Dice Partitions Example88 
 To reduce the complexity of a multiple state system, each of the three die 
can be partitioned into a three component subsystems.  Each partitioned die has 
only six possible states; with three partitions, the number of possible states is 
reduced to 18 (6+6+6).  With all three dice functioning as a single system, “you 
would need to examine 216 different states, checking each for correctness.”  
With each die examined as a separate system, you need only to examine six  
 
                                            
87 Roger Sessions, “A Better Path to Enterprise Architectures,” Microsoft Developers 
Network, April 2006, http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa479371.aspx. 
88 Ibid. 
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different states to ensure the first partition is correct, another six states to ensure 
that the second partition is correct, and other six states to ensure that the third 
partition is correct.89 
 Table 3 extends the number of die to nine to show how rapidly complexity 
increases for non-partitioned systems compared to maintaining partitioned 
functionality.  The goal of software component models is the same as the dice 
metaphor: separate complex system functionality into partitions or components 
with the goal of reducing system complexity with (as explained next) a side 
benefit of component reuse and extensibility.  Partitioning also reduces the 
complexity of risk management, since each partition has a predetermined effect 
on other components.  Risks can then be compartmented to support distributed 
risk models like SEI’s MOSAIC, discussed earlier in this chapter, which is 
particularly well suited to managing risk associated with partitioned complexity.   
 
Table 3.   Partitioned and Non-Partitioned System States90 
                                            
89 Sessions, “A Better Path to Enterprise Architectures.” 
90 Ibid. 
 52
2. Basics of Componentized Design Principles 
Modern component-oriented architectures often subdivide application 
development into tiers that also help segment functionality.  Segments typically 
include a presentation or user interface (UI) layer, a business logic layer and a 
data layer.  Separating major functionality into layers or tiers comprised of 
components facilitates architectural concepts like interoperability, reusability and 
extensibility. 
 
Figure 5. Tiered Application Layers91 
The user interface layers do one thing and one thing only—interact with 
system users.  As illustrated in Figure 4, user interface (UI) components and the 
associated process components do not contain business logic or data access 
code; they simply provide a means for users to enter data and display 
information.  For an example, consider the desktop application in Figure 6.  The 
UI provides a method for users to add, edit or remove data displayed in the table.  
The data table contains information that can be sorted by price, alphabetically, by 
                                            
91 “Three-Layered Services Application,” Microsoft Developers Network, n.d., 
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff648105.aspx. 
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item name or filtered to exclude information.  The table and other interface items 
are separate components that can be reused in other applications since they do 
not contain any logic or data functionality.  Instead, the displayed information is 
fed to the UI via the business logic layer.   
 
Figure 6. Sample Data Application92 
 The business logic layer contains methods that give meaning to raw data 
obtained from the database and feed to the UI.  For example, if the user requests 
(through the UI) a list of customers in the Northwest, the business logic layer will 
query the data layer, manipulate the information depending on the business rules 
of the organization and feed the result to the UI.  Since the business logic is 
comprised of separate components, business logic can be easily modified or 
replaced without having to significantly alter the UI or data access components.   
 The same is true for the data layer.  If new methods for retrieving and 
manipulating data are developed in the future, additional functionality can be 
added to the data layer without impacting the business logic or UI.  Modifying or 
replacing UI, business or data functionality is much more difficult in systems that 
do not implement a componentized, layered architecture.   
                                            
92 Microsoft Visual Studio v10 demonstration application.  
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a. Reusability 
One advantage of using a layered and componentized system 
architecture is the ability to create generalized software components that are 
useable in other unrelated systems.   For example, a business object designed to 
retrieve travel expense data, then calculate and return total cost may be reusable 
in other systems, even if they have different user interface and database system.  
Component use and reuse also has the potential to reduce development time 
and expense by giving developers the option to contract or purchase commercial 
components that can be plugged in to existing systems.   
b. Extensibility 
Another advantage of a modular architecture is the ability to add 
functionality as user needs change over time.  Component-based systems 
contain communication methodologies that allow external components to be 
added as required to meet future needs.  For example, the architecture design 
selected by developers may include an Application Programmer Interface (API) 
that creates source code communication pathways to otherwise non-compatible 
system functionality.  At a higher level, extensibility may simply mean the ability 
to link to a separate organization’s system to share functionality.  An example of 
extensibility is HSIN Next Generation’s video conferencing system, “Connect,” 
which is a separate and complete Adobe product seamlessly integrated into the 
HSIN system.   
c. Interoperability 
Interoperability for software development is “the ability of two or 
more entities to communicate and cooperate regardless of differences in the 
implementation language, the execution environment, or model of abstraction.”93  
The concept differs from extensibility in that interoperable architecture primarily 
 
93 M. Madiajagan and B. Vijayakumar, “Interoperability in Component Based Software 
Development” (2006): 69. 
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involves communication with external systems at the data layer.  This is 
particularly useful for systems that are required to query external legacy systems.  
An organization wishing to share legacy system data may create a data access 
module that is able to communicate through an agnostic text-based 
communication such as XML.  External applications can send and receive data 
via the interoperability incorporated into the system’s architecture. 
3. Architectural Frameworks 
To solve the problem of data integration and to foster effective business 
practices, dozens of computer system and network-centric architectural 
frameworks have come in and out of favor over the past twenty years.  The 
common goal of these frameworks is to separate or componentize complex 
business processes in order to ensure each piece of the puzzle is working 
efficiently and fits the needs of the enterprise.  One of the most commonly used 
frameworks to reduce system complexity is Enterprise Architecture (EA) and its 
more recently developed cousin, Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), each with 
the goal of simplifying complex systems and fostering information and 
functionality sharing.   
a. Enterprise Architecture  
Enterprise Architecture (EA), also known as the Zachman 
Framework, was introduced to the software system development community in 
1987 with the publishing of J. A. Zachman’s article, “A Framework for Information 
Systems Architecture,” in the IBM System Journal.94  The EA concept was 
created to solve two problems: “System complexity—organizations were 
spending more and more money building IT systems; and poor business 
alignment—organizations were finding it more and more difficult to keep those 
 
94 John A. Zachman, A Framework for Information Systems Architecture (Los Angeles, Calif.: 
IBM Los Angeles Scientific Center, 1986). 
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increasingly expensive IT systems aligned with business needs.”95  Zachman 
describes his framework as “simply a logical structure for classifying and 
organizing the descriptive representations of an Enterprise that are significant to 
the management of the Enterprise, as well as to the development of the 
Enterprise's systems.”96  EA provides an intellectual framework for many of the 
system architectural designs used today.  Zachman demonstrated that enterprise 
data, function, network, people, time and motivation are all viewed differently, 
based on the individual’s business model, system model and technology model 
perspective.  Using Zachman’s framework, a system’s architecture is considered 
functional only if meets the needs of each perspective in a way that melds 
business processes into a useful componentized structure. 
Expanding from Zachman’s original concepts, the Department of 
Defense, created the Technical Architecture Framework for Information 
Management (TAFIM) in 1991 and implemented in 1994.97  The first published 
DoD TAFIM document identified services, standards, concepts and components 
that guide the development of architectural design patterns.  
The success of TAFIM prompted Congress to pass the Clinger-
Cohen Act of 1996, also known as the Information Technology Management 
Reform Act, “which mandated that all federal agencies take steps to improve the 
effectiveness of their IT investments.”98  Management of the program was 
eventually passed to the Office of Budget Management (OMB), where it was 




95 Roger Sessions, “A Comparison of the Top Four Enterprise-Architecture Methodologies,” 
Microsoft Developers Network, n.d., http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb466232.aspx. 
96 John A. Zachman, Enterprise Architecture and Legacy Systems: Getting Beyond the 
Legacy (Zachman International, 1996), 1, http://www.ies.aust.com/papers/zachman1.htm. 
97 United States Dept. of Defense and United States. Defense Information Systems Agency, 
“Technical architecture framework for information management,” 1996. 
98 Sessions, “A Comparison of the Top Four Enterprise-Architecture Methodologies.” 
(FEA).  The federal government’s goal for FEA is to divide process functionality 
into core business and global enterprise services that are available to each 
agency as needed. 
 
Figure 7. FEA Segment Map99 
As Figure 6 shows, FEA core mission areas describe functionality 
used within an agency, such as Health or Education.  Enterprise services, like 
security, records management and mapping, are common components used 
across the enterprise.  This framework also ensures all government agencies 
have a common lexicon for describing these services.  This helps facilitate 
component architecture communication and is described in the FEA 
Consolidated Reference Model Document Version 2.3.100   
                                            
99 Office of Management and Budget, Federal Enterprise Architecture Practice Guidance 
(White House, 2007), 3, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/fea_docs/FEA_Practice_Guidance_Nov
_2007.pdf. 
100 Sessions, “A Comparison of the Top Four Enterprise-Architecture Methodologies.” 
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b. Service-Oriented Architecture 
One of DHS’s most difficult challenges for HSIN is to create an 
enterprise architecture that readily enables data and information sharing with 
legacy systems. Creating an effective system that bridges data across 
independent agencies has so far remained an elusive goal for DHS.   
Until recently, sharing separate legacy system databases meant 
feeding data from the various systems into a central repository.  The main 
challenge of feeding a central database is in developing intermediary database 
and code able to communicate with each independent data structure.  To meet 
these challenges and leverage modern network communication technologies, 
Service Oriented Architecture, incorporating EA principles, helps simplify legacy 
system data and functionality sharing.  The SEI explains it this way: 
The reality is that service-oriented architecture (SOA) is currently 
the best option available for systems integration and the leveraging 
of legacy systems. According to a 2007 Gartner Group report, 50% 
of new mission-critical operational applications and business 
processes were designed in 2007 around SOA, and that number 
will be more than 80% by 2010. While the technologies to 
implement SOA will probably change over time, one concept will 
remain: SOA promises a way to design systems that enables cost-
efficiency, agility, adaptability, and the leveraging of legacy 
investments.101 
From a high-level perspective, SOA is a componentized 
architecture that fosters the EA concept of incorporating business processes 
through modern communication and network protocols.  SOA is closely tied to 
the tiered application model that simplifies reuse, extensibility, and 
interoperability by creating applications out of loosely coupled services designed 
to connect legacy systems.  These services are typically delivered via web 
clients, but can also be delivered from service components to desktop application 
clients.   
c. SOA Practical Example 
SOA services provide functionality to any authenticated calling 
application or system designed to consume SOA services.  Suppose Agency A 
maintains a 10+ -year-old database containing customer addresses designed to 
be accessed using desktop applications within the organization.  Agency B 
maintains a similar database of customer data and uses this information to 
generate various reports.   Without a service-oriented architecture, sharing 
information between agencies likely requires custom-built data access 
procedures for each agency with which it wishes to share information   
 
Figure 8. Sample SOA Service Design Specification102 
                                            
101 Software Engineering Institute, “Migrating Legacy Systems to SOA Environments – 
eLearning,” n.d., http://www.sei.cmu.edu/training/v06.cfm. 





                                           
A SOA-based architecture allows Agency A and B to create 
services that hide the details necessary to access their proprietary database.  As 
illustrated in Figure 8, Agency A could create a high-level service called 
CustomerAddressServices that contains a getCustomerAddress method.  
Agency B sends a service request via secure XML and receives the requested 
data via XML data structure.103  Agency B does not need to know anything about 
the database implemented by Agency A other than how to make the request and 
the format to expect in the response (defined in the service specification).  
Complexity associated with database access is handled by the serving agency’s 
service.  If fifteen agencies need to share information, all fifteen can create and 
publish services to query their data, even if each agency uses radically different 
data architecture.  As long a standard communication protocol is used (typically 
XML), retrieving information from one application to another is trivial. 
d. Other SOA Considerations 
Creating a system architecture strategy based on SOA requires an 
extensive initial planning approach when compared to traditional system designs.  
Exposing functionality via services takes additional planning and risk 
management in order to determine what data or functions to provide, how to limit 
access and provide secure data channels between client and service application.   
For multi-agency SOA implementations, a plan must exist to ensure 
SOA methodologies and practices are standardized to reduce complexity across 
the enterprise.  Seemingly simple decisions like method-naming conventions and 
documentation standards can become confused if each agency creates separate 
policies.  The U.S. government sets IT architectural standards through the OMB 
and the Office of E-Government that are communicated through Federal 
Enterprise Architecture (FEA) documentation.  FEA incorporates SOA into their 
reference model construct and establishes a baseline for data, performance, 
business and service component development.  For example, the FEA data 
 
103 Software AG, “Your Guide to SOA Success.” 
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reference model specifications outlines, “XML schema, the data context defined 
by XML namespaces, and data sharing expressed via XML-based request 
exchange patterns used within a the Web service (SOA) framework.”104  U.S. 
government agencies wishing to share data via services must comply with this 
FEA model. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The previous chapter established the need for a dedicated project 
management team for the development or acquisition of large, complex systems.  
The project team needs time and resources to understand and document the 
problem the system is trying to solve.  Gathering and managing user 
requirements is a good first step toward developing a useful system.   
As this chapter shows, acquisition managers also need the time to 
adequately plan and manage risk, and establish a component-based architecture 
that reduces integrated-system complexity.  Unfortunately, these areas are 
sometimes given minimal resources when time is critical.  However, skipping 
these steps can actually create delays if contingency plans and component 
structures are not in place early in a project’s life cycle.  Integrating expandability, 
reusability and interoperability through architectures like SOA can help ensure 
newly developed systems remain viable as technology changes over time.  
Good, up-front enterprise architecture planning that manages complexity can 
help achieve this goal.   
 
104 Office of Management and Budget, Federal Enterprise Architecture The Data Reference 




VI. FINAL ANALYSIS 
It is impossible to design a system so perfect that no one needs to be good. 
—T.S. Eliot 
 
 Designing and acquiring a government software system is certainly a 
challenging task.  If government applications were only required to function on a 
single system for a single user, the complexity associated with networks and 
data sharing would not be an issue.  Of course, government-acquired software 
and data do not live in a self-contained box.  Today’s software must be designed 
to accommodate multiple, geographically separated role-based users, utilize 
local and distributed networks, and provide a means to share and use data and 
functionality.  In many cases, sharing must be accomplished between systems 
that were not originally designed to accommodate outside data requests.  If 
government systems do not meet these information-sharing challenges, as well 
as provide a responsive and reliable interface, newly acquired systems can and 
will fail.  These failures cost taxpayers millions of dollars, and must be avoided.   
 While HSIN is not a failed system, it has struggled to meet its mandate to 
provide users with a solid collaboration and data-sharing platform.  Recent 
upgrades and integration of COTS components have made it more useful.  Also, 
plans for future deployment of Next Generation components are promising.  
However, studying how and why HSIN initially failed to meet user’s expectations 
provides valuable insight into how and why systems falter and sometimes fail.  
Additionally, lessons learned from both failed and successful software 
acquisition programs can help form best practices that bring 20/20 hindsight 
forward to future project success.   
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A. UNDERSTANDING THE PAST TO PROMOTE FUTURE ACQUISITION 
SUCCESS 
HSIN is an example of the need to create a new system that integrates 
several complex legacy systems not originally designed to share information.  As 
initial HSIN development illustrates, the rush to deliver a complex system can 
result in inadequate planning in key areas needed for project success.  Studying 
HSIN demonstrated that program managers should be assigned and adequately 
staffed to ensure that requirements, risk and architectural planning occur 
throughout the project’s life cycle.  This thesis concludes with a summary of 
these three areas and demonstrates that these important planning processes can 
be the difference between a successful or failed project. 
1. Requirements are Central to Software Planning 
 SEI research shows that as many as 20 percent of large, multi-million-
dollar projects are never completed or, when delivered, do not meet its user’s 
needs.105  Many of these projects fail due to a lack of requirements planning that 
make establishing minimum initial functionality and milestones difficult or 
impossible.  Without a comprehensive requirements management plan, projects 
easily lose focus on the problem the system was originally attempting to solve. 
 Developing a strategy to effectively deliver functionality that meets the 
user’s current and future needs requires an understanding of requirements 
processes that have worked in past projects.  The IEEE Software Journal and 
SEI provide outstanding best practices that ensure requirements plans match 
user needs with a functionality set that supports milestone planning and easily 
feeds risk and architecture development plans.   
 Common in best practice requirements methodologies (CMMI and IEEE) 
include user requirements elicitation through user questionnaires, discussion 
groups, operational scenarios and/or a review of business process documents.  
 
105 Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon: Software Development. 
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This phase of planning also consists of a survey of existing technology, currently 
in use, that may match stakeholder functionality requirements.  Results of user 
elicitation can then be prioritized and analyzed to develop an initial functionality 
document that is validated between the stakeholder and developers.  
Functionality that is considered essential becomes part of the initial operation 
capability plan, and the remaining items are set aside until future iterations are 
planned.  From here, risk management and architectural design planning can 
then further the planning process.   
2. Risk Management for Integrated Systems 
 It is difficult to imagine a complex software acquisition that does not 
experience unexpected problems during development and deployment.  Taking 
the time to plan for potential stumbling blocks can help minimize a potential 
problem’s effect on the project.  Not planning for risk can appear to save planning 
time but often results in project teams fighting fires during development that lead 
to delays and unintended consequence.  The increasing complexity of integrated 
software systems make planning for and mitigating risk a critical part of the 
planning process. 
 Good risk management practices require planners to identify potential 
problems that could derail the project by determining the probability and 
expected loss should the risk event occur.  Dr. Barry Boehm’s risk equation helps 
planners quantify identified risks in order to develop a prioritized list from most 
likely and costly risks to low probability and less costly risks.  From here, 
individual risks should be analyzed to determine their effect on other risks that 
can negatively impact the project.  Once initial risk planning is complete, the 
system should be reevaluated for risks as project development progresses and 
contingency plans are executed (as required). 
 SEI’s MOSAIC expands the basic risk-planning approach to methods 
better suited to managing complex distributed systems.  This approach helps 
planners evaluate risk and uncertainty across multiple systems with multiple 
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variables by analyzing organizational processes. MOSAIC’s helps manage 
complex risk problems by segmenting processes, determining process risk and 
the probably of impact on entire enterprise.  This risk approach is particularly 
useful for programs like HSIN, integrating several separate systems that each 
have their own set of potentially interrelated risks.   
3. Architecture to Manage Complexity 
Modern software systems are becoming increasingly complex.  Integrating 
user requirements and risk mitigation requires an architectural plan that 
effectively manages complexity.  Systems that are pieced together over time by 
different developers tend to be difficult to maintain, prone to security issues, and 
do not communicate well with other systems.  An initial investment in best 
practice architectural planning can help ensure systems can easily share 
information and functionality and expand as requirements change. 
Componentized architecture like SOA is becoming an industry standard 
and is fully incorporated into the U.S. government’s Federal Enterprise 
Architecture framework.  FEA, along with solid risk and requirements planning, 
have the potential to help avoid problems encountered by HSIN and to increase 
the probability of future government software acquisition success. 
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APPENDIX  
A. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK AND THE 
DEEPWATER HORIZON GULF OIL SPILL 
United States infrastructure resilience depends on an effective 
government and private industry response when a disaster strikes.  How 
efficiently government and industry responds to a national crisis plays a 
tremendous role in the degree and length of impact on the nation.  The time it 
takes to initiate recovery operations often depends on the government’s ability to 
coordinate actions with the industry that owns the recovery infrastructure.   
Ensuring this coordination and communication takes place during a 
disaster is primarily the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).  Given the risks associated with extraction and transportation of oil and 
gas, the U.S. energy sector requires well-coordinated and planned emergency 
actions to reestablish flow when disruptions occur.  The April 2010 explosion of 
the oil platform Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico provides an example of 
how a disaster in this sector can affect the economy, commodity levels and the 
environment.   
HSIN in its current form allows emergency responders to coordinate 
recovery plans, delegate responsibility, and follow up on actions that support a 
rapid disaster response.  During the early stages of a national disaster, 
determining the command structure is key to an effective response.  DHS is 
responsible for establishing the crisis-response command structure and uses 
HSIN to coordinate actions that begin infrastructure and recovery operations.  
On 20 April 2010, a Beyond Petroleum (BP)-owned oilrig platform, the 
Deepwater Horizon, exploded in the Gulf of Mexico, killing eleven oil workers and 
creating one of the worst oil spills on record in the U.S.  The explosion resulted in 
as much as 62,000 barrels of oil gushing into the gulf per day, creating the 
potential for irreparable damage to several critical Gulf Coast natural resources.  
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At the time of the disaster, damage to the region’s fishing and tourism industries 
was estimated to cost the local economy several billion dollars.106 
Immediately after the Deepwater Horizon explosion, DHS dispatched the 
U.S. Coast Guard to rescue 126 platform workers and established a command 
center for the, “16 federal departments and agencies responsible for coordinating 
emergency preparedness and response to oil and hazardous substance pollution 
events.” 107  The Department of Interior’s (DOI) role in the emergency response 
was to ensure BP could provide an adequate response plan to stop the leak and 
communicate progress to DHS and to the President of the United States.  For 
daily operations, the Coast Guard was assigned the mission of coordinating 
Regional Response Teams and to act as on-scene incident command to 
orchestrate the actions of the Defense Department, Environment Protection 
Agency, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Small Business 
Administration, Department of Labor and the National Parks Service.   
 To facilitate information flow between these agencies, DHS established an 
HSIN portal called MC252 under the Emergency Management Community of 
Interest.  MC252 allowed the Department of the Interior and Coast Guard to 
establish a secure collaboration environment for all involved government entities.  
The portal also highlights some of the enhancements DHS put in place during 
HSIN’s “Next Generation” upgrade, which was still in progress at the time of the 
disaster.  
 One of these Next Generation components is the recently revamped 
common operating picture (COP) system.  This component provided users with 
real-time, constantly updated information concerning the spill.  Another purpose 
of the Deepwater Horizon Incident COP is to provide a tracking system for 
deployed forces responding to the incident.  Service members from all branches 
 
106 John Kennedy, “Economist: Oil disaster could cost Florida economy 39,000 jobs, $2.2 
billion,” Palm Beach Post, June 7, 2010, http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/state/economist-
oil-disaster-could-cost-florida-economy-39-732979.html. 
107 “Deepwater BP Oil Spill,” Whitehouse.gov, n.d., http://www.whitehouse.gov/deepwater-
bp-oil-spill. 
of the military services, including the Coast Guard and National Guard mobilized 
to respond to the crisis.  The COP provided a way for each service to locate and 
communicate with other responders. 
 
Figure 9. HSIN Common Operating Picture for MC252108 
As Figure 8 shows, the MC252 portal also tracks media reports and 
internal requests for information. Responsibility is assigned for each task, along 
with updated status information.  Each assigned task has a tracking date, source, 
and resolution information once complete.  Users can search questions already 
asked before submitting additional requests.  The MC252 portal also includes 
maps, critical infrastructure information, media monitoring and a Request for 
Information (RFI) tracker.  A library of reports and other documents, along with a 
MC252 specific video meeting application (Adobe Connect), was added to this 
event specific portal.   
                                            





Well-coordinated interagency action following a disaster can shorten the 
time required to begin recovery operations and bring systems back online.  
Despite its rocky start in 2004, HSIN upgrades seem to have increased its 
usefulness as an interagency collaboration tool.  The use of HSIN to create the 
MC252 portal and its use among government agencies for disaster recovery 
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